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This paper analyzes a fully funded social security system under the assumption that agents 
face temptation issues. Agents are required to save through individually managed Personal 
Security Accounts without, and with mandatory annuitization. When the analysis is restricted 
to CRRA preferences our results are congruent with the literature indicating that the complete 
elimination of social security is the reform scenario that maximizes welfare improvement. 
However, when self control preferences are introduced, and as the intensity of self control 
becomes progressively more severe the "social security elimination" scenario loses ground 
very rapidly. In fact, in the case of very severe temptation the elimination of social security 
becomes the least desirable alternative. Under the light of the above findings, any reform 
proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures from standard 
preferences to preference specifications suitable for dealing with preference reversals. 
JEL Code: E60, H55. 
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There is an abundance of studies related to the importance of social security and its
impact on welfare. The primary reason for this is its dramatically growing scale which
triggers renewed academic debate regarding the optimal allocation of the available re-
sources. This controversy stems from the huge monetary burden that the mere presence
and administration of a social security system entails for the society and the associated
budget implications: Old age, disability, unemployment and health insurance policies
have evolved into the most expensive items on government budgets.
Most of the studies that seem to emerge as a direct or implicit o⁄spring of this debate
focus on the welfare implications of alternative social security schemes in an economy. In
the very core of this debate one can clearly identify the dilemma between an "unfunded"
(Pay-As-You-Go) versus a "funded" social security system. In an unfunded system, re-
sources are transferred statically from the working population to the concurrent retirees
(inter-generational transfers). In contrast, a funded system prescribes a dynamic alloca-
tion of resources within the same generation (inter-temporal within the same generation
transfers). While both systems rely on an external institution (e.g. government) in
order to be implemented, their di⁄erent logic and mechanics eventually induce entirely
di⁄erent risk sharing properties as well as savings incentives. Therefore, their welfare
implications may signi￿cantly di⁄er because of this di⁄erence.
Population ageing as a result of the declining population growth rate and decreasing
birth rate have challenged enormously the sustainability of a PAYG system and called for
a minimization of the ￿scal burden through tax reforms and bene￿ts restructuring. As a
result, there are numerous studies suggesting alternative institutional arrangements that
could be more robust to adverse demographic shocks. However, as much as converting
an unfunded system to a fully (or partially) funded one may seem a plausible solution,
in most cases the transition costs associated with such a reform make it prohibitively
costly [DeNardi et al. (1999)].
The welfare implications of social security are well identi￿ed in the relevant literat-
ure.1 Several studies [e.g. Storesletten et al. (1999)] comparing di⁄erent social security
systems typically compare welfare across alternative steady states, each corresponding
to a stationary equilibrium with a di⁄erent social security system. Focusing only on
unfunded social security, Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) emphasize the detrimental e⁄ects
that such an arrangement has to the overall welfare in a country.
However, all the above studies ignore alternative preference speci￿cations that may
1The interest in the welfare implications of a social security system has been sparked with the
seminal work of Diamond (1965). The ￿rst quantitative model that assessed the welfare implications of
the system was created by Auerbach & Kotliko⁄ (1987).
2be binding in several cases: Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and Fehr et al. (2008) use time-
inconsistent preferences while Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) use self-control preferences
to highlight that in a context of unfunded social security welfare may be critically af-
fected by the preference speci￿cation. In a recent paper, Fehr & Kindermann (2009)
study the implications of individual retirement accounts (IRA) on economic aggregates
and welfare in the context of a general equilibrium model populated by either rational
individuals or individuals with time-inconsistent preferences. Furthermore, the experi-
mental economics literature documents some evidence that preferences show some degree
of time inconsistency and agents su⁄er from temptation, a fact that further supports the
results in the aforementioned studies.2
In this study, we would like to quantitatively assess the welfare implications of the
reform of the current unfunded social security system into a partially funded or fully
privatized one, under the assumption that individuals face self-control problems. We
proceed by assessing in terms of welfare a hybrid (partially funded) social security system
under the alternative hypotheses of self-control or CRRA preferences. The apparatus by
means of which we model departures from unfunded social security is a Personal Security
Account (PSA). Within that class of "funded" models, we investigate two competing
scenarios involving PSAs: one without mandatory annuitization and an alternative one
that prescribes a mandatory annuitization of retirement bene￿ts.
Moreover, in order to capture our agents￿temptation towards current consumption,
our model economies make use of the preference structure pioneered by Phelps & Pollak
(1968) and further elaborated by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) to model self-control issues.
Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) identi￿ed a particular class of utility functions that provide a
time-consistent model suitable for addressing the preference reversals that motivated the
time inconsistency literature. The key theme here is that self-control preferences assume
that agents maximize a utility function that is a ￿ compromise￿between the standard
utility (or ￿ commitment￿utility) and a ￿ temptation￿utility. The con￿ icting ways by
which agents derive utility in this setting, is the device through which the trade-o⁄
between the temptation to consume on the one hand, and the long-run self interest of
the agent on the other is captured. The main bene￿t is that self-control preferences
remain perfectly time-consistent and, contrary to time-inconsistent preferences, allow
agents in our model to commit.
With the exception of the aforementioned di⁄erence in the speci￿cation of preferences,
our model speci￿cation follows that of Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and Fuster et al. (2005).
Furthermore, our economic environment features uninsurable individual income shocks,
borrowing constraints and missing annuity markets.
2For a recent overview of studies that provide evidence that individuals indeed exhibit bias toward
immediate grati￿cation see Frederick et al. (2002).
3We aim to contribute to the debate on the reform of social security. Our augmented
model allows us to look at the welfare gains or losses due to the reforms from a di⁄erent
angle. In particular, it allows us to assess the welfare-enhancing potential of mandatory
savings versus mandatory annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement. For
the sake of comparability of our results, the particular speci￿cation of those alternative
policies is purposely chosen to match the proposals analyzed in the literature (Stores-
letten et al. (1999) and Fuster et al. (2005)), as well as those featuring in the reform
recommendations made by the 1997 Advisory Council on Social Security.
Moreover, changing the preference structure is very important for theoretical pur-
poses because it enhances our understanding of the mechanics of similar models in the
literature by providing an additional channel through which capital accumulation is dis-
torted. Equally importantly, an augmented preference structure is also essential for
providing a comprehensive comparison framework for policy makers in their evaluation
of various proposals. As shown in Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and Kumru & Thanopoulos
(2008) the presence of slightly far-sighted or current consumption favored agents changes
substantially the welfare implications of the system.
Our results in this paper highlight the important role that self control preferences
play, especially with regards to the kind of reform that could generate the highest welfare.
While if we restrict our analysis to CRRA preferences our ￿ndings initially con￿rm those
in other studies (e.g.,Fuster et al. (2005)), i.e., we also ￿nd that the complete elimination
of social security is the policy that maximizes welfare, we come across a drastic alteration
of this outcome when self-control preferences are introduced: the elimination of social
security is the least desirable policy reform from the point of view of welfare. That is, the
presence of self-control preferences renders the elimination scenario the least appealing
one compared to the examined alternatives.
Along the same lines, our research indicates that the clear-cut advantage of the elim-
ination scenario under CRRA preferences fades away as self control becomes gradually
more severe. Our robustness tests con￿rm this ￿nding: in the case of severe temptation
the CRRA pecking order is completely reversed, and the elimination of social security
becomes the least desirable scenario.
Under the light of the above ￿ndings, any reform proposal regarding the social security
system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference speci￿cations
suitable for dealing with preference reversals.
42 A Model of Social Security
The model we consider in this section is quite standard in the social security literature.
In particular, our model follows that of Imrohoroglu et al. (2003).
2.1 The Environment
We consider a stationary overlapping generations economy in discrete time. Each period
a new generation is born which is modeled to be n percent larger than the previous
generation. Agents face lives of uncertain duration and some live through the maximum
possible life span, denoted by J. At any given time j within their life-span, all agents
have a (time-invariant) conditional probability sj 2 (0;1) of surviving from age j ￿ 1 to
j, conditional on having survived up to age j ￿1: Our stationary population assumption
implies that age j agents constitute a fraction ￿j of the population at any given date.
The cohort shares f￿jgJ




while their sum is normalized to 1.
2.2 Preferences
Agents in our economy feature self-control preferences. That is, their preferences are such
that in every period they induce a temptation to consume their entire wealth. Resisting
temptation gives rise to a self-control cost; note that the latter feature is absent in models
with CRRA and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. We follow Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) and
DeJong & Ripoll (2007) and proceed to model self-control preferences recursively.
Let W(x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function
with state x. The utility function of an agent is as follows:
W(x) = max
c fu(c) + v(c) + ￿EW(x
0)g ￿ max
￿ c v(￿ c) (1)
where E is the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions; 0 < ￿ < 1 is a discount factor; c represents the "commitment" consumption;
￿ c is the "temptation" consumption; and x0 denotes next period state variable. As in the
section above, u(:) represents the momentary utility function and v(:) represents tempta-
tion. In particular, v(c) ￿ max
￿ c v(￿ c) denotes the disutility from choosing consumption c
instead of ￿ c. The concavity or convexity of v(:) turns out to be very important for our
5analysis.3
The momentary utility, convex temptation and concave temptation functions are









v(c) = ￿u(c) (4)
In the speci￿cation above, higher values of the scale parameter ￿ > 0, imply an
increase in the share of "temptation" utility, i.e. a higher ￿ increases the importance of
current consumption for an agent. The momentary utility function u(:) is a standard
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form, ￿ > 0 measures the degree of relative
risk aversion (and 1=￿ the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution).
2.3 Production Function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces
output (Yt) by using labor input (Lt = 0:94
j￿￿1 P
j=1
￿j￿j ),4 and capital input (Kt) which is
rented from households:





where At represents the state of technology; ￿ 2 (0;1) is the capital￿ s share of out-
put. De￿ning the capital-labor ratio as Kt
Lt, we can write the production function in the
intensive form as follows:
yt = f(kt) = Atk
￿
t
The technology parameter At grows at a constant rate g and capital depreciates at a
constant rate ￿. Competitive ￿rms in this economy maximize their pro￿ts by setting




t ￿ ￿ (6)
3Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:) + u(:) is stricly concave. In particular,
￿ > 0, ￿ > 1 and 0 < ￿ < ￿=(c￿+1c￿￿2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:) + v(:) is
strictly concave. When v(:) is concave, one should show that W(:) is strictly concave.
4j￿ denotes the compulsory retirement age and ￿j denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age j agent.
6wt = At(1 ￿ ￿)k
￿
t (7)
Since we are concerned only with the behavior of steady-state equilibria , we will
henceforth drop the time subscript for the rest of the analysis.
2.4 Budget Constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is j￿. Agents who are younger than
age j￿ face a stochastic employment opportunity at each period j < j￿. Individuals
who ￿nd an employment opportunity, supply inelastically one unit of labor.5 We denote
the employment state variable by e 2 f0;1g where 0 and 1 denote unemployment and
employment states respectively. Furthermore, we postulate that the employment state
follows a ￿rst-order Markov process. The transition probability distribution between the
current employment state e and next period￿ s employment state e0 is represented by the
2 ￿ 2 matrix ￿(e0;e) = [￿k0k] where k0;k = 0;1 and ￿k0k = Prfe0 = k0je = kg.
An employed (e = 1) agent earns w￿j where w denotes the wage rate per e¢ ciency
unit of labor in terms of the consumption good and ￿j denotes the e¢ ciency index of
an age j agent. If, on the other hand, an agent is unemployed (e = 0), he receives an
unemployment insurance bene￿t equal to a fraction ￿ of the wage of an employed agent,
resulting in the amount ￿w￿j; ￿ is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.





(1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿u)w￿j for j = 1;2;:::;j￿ ￿ 1; if e = 1;
￿w￿j for j = 1;2;:::;j￿ ￿ 1; if e = 0;
bj for j = j￿;j￿ + 1;:::;J.
where ￿s and ￿u represent the social security payroll tax rate and the unemployment
insurance tax rate respectively.6
We assume away any private insurance markets against unemployment risk and
private annuities￿markets against the risk of outliving one￿ s own resources7. The only
available device to smooth consumption across one￿ s lifetime is the accumulation of assets
5Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modi￿cation of preferences in a way that
agents are not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
6Note that in the US social security system both retirement and unemployment bene￿ts are taxed
(Diamond & Orszag (2005)). For the sake of less cumbersome notation we refrain from incorporating
those taxes in our analysis.
7Although a market for private annuities exists in the U.S. it is nevertheless very thin (Feldstein
& Liebman (2002), Imrohoroglu et al. (1995)). Hence, our assumption seems innocuous. In our
model, social security partially ful￿lls the role of the missing annuities￿market (it can be considered as
mandatory annutization). Diamond et al. (2005) analyze thoroughly the relationship between annuities
and individual welfare. He shows that full annuitization of wealth is optimal under certain conditions.
7in terms of physical capital. Agents cannot hold negative assets at any period.8 Since
death is certain at J and there is no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can be
stated as:9
(
aj ￿ 0 for j = 1;:::J ￿ 1
aj = 0 for j = J
We can now proceed to write the growth-adjusted budget constraint of an agent as
follows
(1 + g)aj + ￿w￿j + ct = (1 + r)aj￿1 + qj + ￿ (8)
(1 + g)aj + ￿w￿j + ￿ cj = (1 + r)aj￿1 + qj + ￿ (9)
where r is the rate of return from asset holdings and ￿ denotes the amount of accidental
bequests, to be distributed equally to all alive members of the society. The compulsory
contribution/deposit rate for personal security accounts (PSA) ￿ is greater than zero for
employed individuals if PSAs exist in the economy, otherwise, ￿ = 0. The details for the
law of motion of the PSAs are given in the next section.
2.5 Social Security and Fiscal Policy
We consider three distinct social security arrangements: Pay-As-You-Go, Personal Se-
curity Accounts without annuitization, and Personal Security Accounts with mandatory
annuitization. We follow Fuster et al. (2005) as far as our modelling of Personal Security
Accounts is concerned.
2.5.1 PAYG
A PAYG system in our model economy resembles to that of the US Economy. Agents
retire at age j￿ and receive social security bene￿t b. The social security bene￿t b is de￿ned
8In other words, an agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity) constraint. Given the size of private
credit markets, this assumption may not seem so innocuous. There are two main reasons behind this
assumption: First, we would like to engage in a careful comparison of our results with those of the
existing social security literature where this assumption is a standard one. Second, the fact that agents
are not allowed to borrow against their future income induces an additional boost in (private) savings
for precautionary purposes, since they may become/remain unemployed with a positive probability. It
would be a fair question to explore the consequences of alleviating this constraint in our environment
and allow borrowing against future income. In that case however, the ability to borrow would lower
agents￿marginal propensity to save (for precautionary reasons), thus implying that the e⁄ects of self-
control and ability to borrow against future income are highly correlated; consequently, the e⁄ect of
social security on savings due to self-control will be non-identi￿able. In a recent paper, Rojas & Urrutia
(2008) show that adding an endogenous borrowing constraint reduces the welfare cost of having a social
security.
9Allowing a bequest motive does change the welfare implications of a social security system. Fuster
et al. (2003) make a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show that steady
state welfare increases with social security.
8as a fraction ￿ of an average life-time employed income, which is, notably, independent




j￿￿1 for j = j￿;j￿ + 1;:::;J.
While technology grows at rate g, the pension payments remain constant during
retirement. Therefore, the growth-adjusted pension payments are given as follows:
bj =
b
(1+g)j￿j￿ for j = j￿;j￿ + 1;:::;J.
The social security system is self-￿nancing and the government administers the pro-
gram. We restrict our attention to social security arrangements that are described by












where ￿j(a;e) is the set of age dependent, time invariant measures of individuals.
If agents in this economy die before age J, their remaining assets will be distributed








￿j￿j(a;e)(1 ￿ sj+1)aj(a;e) (11)
2.5.2 Personal Security Accounts (PSA) without Annuitization
In this section, we consider a two-tier social security system. The ￿rst tier is a PAYG-
￿nanced universal ￿ at pension bene￿t. The amount of bene￿t is set as 10% of the per
capita gross domestic product (GDP). As in the above benchmark case, the ￿rst tier is














where b￿ = 0:10y and y = w=(1 ￿ ￿).














9The second tier of retirement bene￿ts is ￿nanced through mandatory savings. In this
setting, employed individuals are required to deposit 2:7% of their earnings into their
privately managed personal savings account. The funds on PSA earn the tax-free rate
of return on capital and they cannot be withdrawn until the mandatory retirement age.
Individuals￿second-tier bene￿ts depend on the funds accumulated in their PSAs. The
law of motion for the PSA is the following:
(1 + g){j+1 = (1 + r){j + ￿w￿j, (12)
{1 = 0;
where ￿ = 0:027 is the required deposit rate and {j+1 denotes an age j + 1 individual￿ s
accumulated PSA funds. Individuals receive a lump-sum transfer of funds accumulated




b￿ + (1 + r){j￿, for j = j￿
b￿
(1+g)j￿j￿, otherwise
If an individual dies before one￿ s retirement, the accumulated funds in his PSA ac-
count are distributed to the remaining members of the society in a lump-sum fashion








￿j￿j(a;e)(1 ￿ sj+1)[aj(a;e) + {j(e)] (13)
2.5.3 Personal Security Accounts with Mandatory Annuitization (PSA+Annuity)
We consider a two-tier pension system here as well. While the ￿rst tier is exactly the
same as that of the previous section, the second tier di⁄ers. The government annuitizes
funds accumulated in individuals￿PSAs and hence, individuals receive annuity payments
equal to b0 = p(1+r){j￿, where p denotes the proportion, i.e., the amount of an annuity
payment received by an individual, which is obviously proportional to the accumulated
funds in his PSA account, and is determined endogenously.
The government sets the proportion p in such a way that the expected present value
of the aggregate annuity payments of the generation that retires now ( ￿ E) is equal to
the funds held in PSAs, including the funds of individuals from the same generation
who died before their retirement. The expected present value of the aggregate annuity
payments of the generation that retires now is equal to the following:








The aggregate funds of the individuals from the same generation who survived to retire-





































Because individuals￿survival rates do not depend on their types in our model economy,
the above return is actuarially fair, it could be o⁄ered by private ￿rms and there is
no need for government intervention. Yet, in our model, the private annuity market is
closed by assumption and hence the government has to administer it. If individuals￿
survival rates were type-dependent, the above equation would yield an actuarially not
fair premium. This, in turn, would call for government intervention because adverse
selection issues would cause a market breakdown.
The law of motion of the funds aggregated in PSA by the government is the following:
(1 + n)(1 + g)zt+1 = (1 + r)zt + ￿wL ￿ B
0;
where ￿ = 0:027 is the social security tax rate, L = 0:94
j￿￿1 X
j=1
￿j￿j is the aggregate labor
supply, and B0 =
J X
j=j￿
b0(1 + g)j￿￿j￿j is the aggregate annuity payment at time t.
Hence, the expression for retirement bene￿ts featuring PSAs under a mandatory
annuitization scheme can be written as follows:
11bj =
b￿ + b0
(1 + g)j￿j￿ for j = j
￿;:::;J:
In addition to a social security program, the government also runs a self-￿nancing
unemployment program. The self-￿nancing condition for the unemployment insurance











￿j￿j(a;e = 0)￿w￿j; (15)
where ￿ is the unemployment insurance replacement rate.
2.6 An Agent￿ s Dynamic Program
We assume that the temptation function v(:) is strictly increasing, i.e., an agent is temp-
ted to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that the agent maximizes
the second part of equation (1) by holding zero assets for the next period, i.e., setting
aj = 0 in equation (9). In this economy, the agent￿ s state vector x contains the cur-
rent asset holdings and the employment state. Hence, we can write the agent￿ s dynamic
program for any arbitrary two periods as follows:
W(x) = max
c fu(c) + v(c) + ￿Es0W(x
0)g ￿ v((1 + r)a + q + ￿) (16)
subject to
a
0 + c = (1 + r)a + q + ￿, a
0 ￿ 0, a0 is given. (17)
where Es0 denotes the expectation over survival probabilities.
If the agent succumbs to a temptation and consumes his entire wealth, the term
v(c)￿v((1+r)a+q+￿) in the equation above cancels out. When he resists to temptation
and consumes less than his wealth, he faces a self-control cost at the amount of v(c) ￿
v((1+r)a+q+￿). The agent tries to balance his urge for utility from current consumption
v(c) and long-term commitment utility u(c) + ￿Es0W(x0).
2.7 Steady State Equilibrium
In our characterization of the steady-state equilibrium, we follow Imrohoroglu et al.
(2003) and Hugget & Ventura (1999).
Given a set of government policy f￿;￿;￿s;￿u;￿g; a steady-state recursive competitive
12equilibrium is a set of value functions fWj(x)gJ
j=1, household policy rules faj(x)gJ
j=1,
time-invariant measures of agents f￿j(x)gJ
j=1, wage and interest rate (w;r), and a lump-
sum distribution of accidental bequests ￿ such that all of them satisfy the following:
￿ Factor prices (w;r) that are derived from the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order conditions satisfy
the equations (6) and (7).
￿ Given the government policy set f￿;￿;￿s;￿u;￿g, the factor prices (w;r); and the
lump-sum transfer of accidental bequests ￿, an agent￿ s policy rule faj(x)gJ
j=1 solves









￿j￿j(x)[aj￿1(x) + {j]: (18)










where ￿1 is given.
￿ The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests ￿ satis￿es the equation (11) if
the PAYG or PSA+Annuity programs are in use, or else it satis￿es the equation
(13) if the PSA program is in use.
￿ Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance bene￿t program
are self-￿nancing.







￿j￿j(x)[aj(x) + {j(x) + cj(x)] (20)









In this section, we brie￿ y de￿ne the parameter values of our model. Each period in our
model corresponds to a calendar year.
133.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Agents are born at a real life age of 21(model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum
real life age of 85 (model age of 65). The population growth rate n is assumed to be
equal to the average U.S. population growth rate between 1931-2003 which corresponds,
on average, to 1:19% per year10. The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is
the same as the Social Security Administration￿ s sequence of survival probabilities for
men in the year 2001. The mandatory retirement age is equal to 65 (model age 45). In
order to set the e¢ ciency index, we choose the average of Hansen (1993)￿ s estimation
of median wage rates for males and females for each age group. We interpolate the
data by using the Spline Method and normalize the interpolated data to average unity.
The employment transition probabilities are chosen to be compatible with the average
unemployment rate in the U.S. which is approximately equal to 0:06 between 1948 and









We choose the values of preference parameters ￿;￿;￿ and ￿ in such a way that our model
economy￿ s capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy.
In the case where the temptation function v(:) is convex, we choose to follow Imro-
horoglu et al. (2003) and DeJong & Ripoll (2007), in letting ￿ be centered at 2 with a
standard deviation 1, i.e., ￿ = 2(1). In our benchmark calibration, we initially set ￿ = 2,
and then check the robustness of our results by letting ￿ = 3. Holding ￿ constant, we
choose di⁄erent values of ￿ a priori, and calculate the corresponding ￿ in such a way
that u(:) + v(:) stays a strictly concave function. For every triple ￿;￿ and ￿, we search
over the values of ￿ that deliver the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its
empirical counterpart. We assume that the social security replacement ratio is 50% and
the unemployment replacement ratio is 25% during our search.
When the temptation function is concave, we follow DeJong & Ripoll (2007) and set
￿ = 0:0786(0:056)
10The population data are obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau (2006)) .
11The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor (US Department of Labor
(2006)).
143.3 Production Parameters
The parameters describing the production side of the economy are chosen to match the
long-run features of the U.S. economy. Following Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)), we set the
capital share of output ￿ equal to 0:310 and the annual depreciation rate of physical
capital equal to 0:069. The rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to
2:1%; which is the actual average growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time
interval from 1959 to 1994 (Hugget & Ventura (1999)). The technology parameter A;
can be chosen freely. In our calibration exercises, it is set equal to 1:01. All per capita
quantities are assumed to grow at a constant rate g.
3.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio (￿) equal to 25% of the employed
wage. In the benchmark case, we set the social security replacement ratio (￿) equal
to 50%. Alternatively, we can choose the payroll tax rate (￿s) and the unemployment
insurance tax rate (￿u) instead of the replacement ratios. Since the social security and the
unemployment insurance bene￿ts are self-￿nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios
will automatically pin-down the tax rates. This holds true because agents inelastically
supply one unit of labor whenever they ￿nd an opportunity to work, and changes in
tax rates do not a⁄ect their supply of labor.12 In the PSA cases, the ￿rst tier universal
bene￿ts are set equal to 10% of per capita GDP and the social security tax rate for
second tier bene￿ts ￿ is set equal to 2:7%.
3.5 Solution Method
We use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques to ￿nd a steady-state equi-
librium of our hypothetical economy by using the aforementioned parameter values. Our
solution method designedly resembles those of previous studies.13
A discrete set of asset values (containing 4097 points) is created. The lower bound
and upper bound of the set are chosen in such a way that the set never binds.14 While
the state space for working age agents comprises 4097 ￿ 2 points, the state space for
retired agents consists of only 4097 ￿ 1 points (since there is no state transition after
j￿).The discrete set of the control variable (consumption) contains 4097 ￿ 1 points. We
start with a guess about the aggregate capital stock and the level of accidental bequests
12However, if we calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of
replacement rates.
13See Imrohoroglu et al. (1995 and 2003) and Hugget and Ventura(1999).
14In particular, the lower bound is equal to 0 and the upper bound is equal to 60 times greater than
the annual income of an employed agent.
15and then solve agents￿dynamic program by backward recursion. The time-invariant,
age-dependent distribution of agents is obtained by forward recursion. After each loop,
we calculate the new values for the accidental bequests and the capital stock. If the
di⁄erence between the initial values and the new values exceed the tolerance value, we
start a new loop with the new values. This procedure continues until we ￿nd values for
the accidental bequests and the capital stock that are su¢ ciently close to their beginning-
of-loop values.
Table 1: Parameter Values of The Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
Maximum possible life span T 65
Obligatory retirement age t￿ 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fstgT
t=1 U.S. 2001




Capital share of GDP ￿ 0:310
Annual depreciation of capital stock ￿ 0:069
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%






Annual discount factor of utility ￿ 0:998
Scale factor of the temptation utility ￿ 0:000375
Risk aversion parameter ￿ 2:0
Risk loving parameter ￿ 2:0
Government
Unemployment insurance replacement ratio ￿ 0:25
Social security replacement ratio ￿ [0;1]
Compulsory deposit rate ￿ 0:027
4 Results
In this section we ￿rst calibrate our model economy to the US data under the assumption
that individuals have CRRA preferences and a PAYG system that is similar to that of the
US is in use. We choose the social security replacement rate as 40% since it corresponds
to the current average social security replacement rate in the US. Our aim is to gradually
converge to the long term average of the US capital-output ratio of 2:5. Subsequently,
we proceed to look at the implications of three reform proposals:
16The ￿rst reform proposal postulates the substitution of the current social security
system by a two-tier scheme: a universal PAYG-￿nanced basic pension combined with a
Personal Security Account that does not require mandatory annuitization of bene￿ts at
retirement.
The second reform proposal is similar to the ￿rst one except that it prescribes a
mandatory annuitization of the funds accumulated in PSA accounts.
Finally, the third reform proposal suggests the complete removal of the social security
system; in terms of our model, this amounts to postulating that the social security
replacement ratio is equal to zero.
The e⁄ects that the three competing scenarios have on economic aggregates, as well as
their welfare implications are given in Table 2. The welfare implications of a given policy
are measured in terms of the average expected utility (EU). The average expected utility
of a policy is given in the last column of Table 2. Both our ￿rst reform proposal (featuring
as "PSA" in Table 2) and our second one (featuring as "PSA+ Annuity" in Table 2)
prescribe a speci￿c (given) rate of mandatory savings. We assume that the mandatory
savings rate, denoted by ￿, is equal to 2:7% of the gross individual labor income. As a
consequence, individuals￿payments to the social security system across PAYG, PSA, and
PSA+Annuity policies are all equalized. It is a well established result in the literature
that funded or partially funded social security systems induce an increase in capital
accumulation as well as in other aggregate variables such as consumption and output (e.g.
Storesletten et al. (1999)). However, the exact magnitudes of increase of those aggregate
variables are sensitively dependent to the features of the model. Fuster et al. (2005)
demonstrate that the increases in the absolute levels of aggregate variables are more
moderate in an economy populated by altruistic individuals compared to an economy
without altruistic individuals. Previous studies (Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Imrohoroglu
et al. (2003), and Hugget & Ventura (1999)) also demonstrated that decreasing the
social security replacement rate improves the social welfare whenever individuals have
CRRA preferences. Their key ￿nding was that the complete elimination of a PAYG
system would deliver the highest social welfare.
In all tables, the values of the levels of economic aggregates as well as the average
expected utility are normalized to 100 under a PAYG system. The values of the various
reform proposals are calculated accordingly. Our results in Table 2 are consistent with
those of previous studies mentioned above. Since both PSA and PSA+Annuity reform
proposals entail less distortion on savings, something that comes as a consequence of
a low level of payroll tax, the level of capital stock in both cases is higher than that
of a PAYG system. Not surprisingly, the complete elimination of a PAYG system also
induces a higher capital stock compared to that of PAYG. Capital stock levels in PSA and
PSA+Annuity reforms are higher than in the elimination scenario because individuals
17cannot borrow against the funds accumulated in their PSA accounts, even if it might be
optimal to do so for consumption smoothing purposes. Note that the capital stock levels
of elimination and PSA & PSA+Annuity reforms are quite close numerically. Moreover,
as it is the case in Fuster et al. (2005), the PSA+Annuity reform generates the highest
capital stock.
An immediate interpretation of this lies in the fact that, as in Fuster et al. (2005),
under the PSA+Annuity scenario the funds of the deceased are invested in the capital
market while under the PSA scenario they are transferred to the estates, resulting in a
higher capital stock in the former scenario. The complete elimination of social security
scenario induces the highest welfare improvement followed by the PSA+Annuity and PSA
reforms respectively. This happens because the elimination reform allows individuals
to engage in consumption smoothing more e¢ ciently than the other proposed reforms.
Note that welfare improvements generated by all three reform proposals are very close
in magnitude because the respective levels of capital stock do not di⁄er much.
Table 2: CRRA Preferences
￿s(%) ￿(%) K Y C K=Y EU
PAYG 3.6 0 100 100 100 2.529 100
PSA 0.9 2.7 113.631 104.035 101.508 2.763 103.280
PSA+Annuity 0.9 2.7 122.703 106.543 102.808 2.913 103.563
Elimination 0 0 114.331 104.237 101.499 2.774 104.108
The large and growing literature on time inconsistency and self-control issues suggests
that preference speci￿cations capturing individuals￿self-control problems might provide
richer insights to the observed behavior of individuals (for example see Frederick et al.
(2002)). Needless to say, both time inconsistent preferences ￿ la Phelps & Pollak (1968)
and self-control preferences ￿ la Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) have been extensively used in
an attempt to shed light to various macroeconomic problems, with issues pertaining to
social security being among the most prominent ones.
More speci￿cally, while Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) analyze the welfare implications
of the elimination of a PAYG-type social security system in an economy populated by
individuals with time inconsistent preferences, Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) analyze
the same policy proposal in an economy populated by individuals with self control pref-
erences. The latter study concludes that the welfare implications of the elimination of
the PAYG system may vary drastically even if individuals￿self control problems di⁄er
only to a small extent.
Although the elimination of a PAYG social security system is one policy option,
transforming the system into a partially or fully-funded one could very well be alternative
18policies worth investigating. The types of PSA and PSA+Annuity policies we analyze
in this paper are similar to the ones analyzed Storesletten et al. (1999) and Fuster et al.
(2005) and those proposed in the reform recommendations made by the 1997 Advisory
Council on Social Security15. In what follows, we proceed to examine the implications
of the aforementioned reform proposals under the assumption that individuals have self-
control preferences. Before presenting our results for the benchmark case, we ￿rst explain
the behavioral implications of the existence of temptation and then quantify the e⁄ects
of temptation on economic aggregates.
Following DeJong & Ripoll (2007), Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) calculated the
quantity of steady-state consumption that would have to be given up by a self control
individual in order to escape from temptation; Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) showed that
individuals would be willing to forgo as much as 4:82% of their steady state consumption
in order to eliminate temptation. This clearly demonstrates the welfare reducing e⁄ect
that a self-control problem entails.
Next, we quantify steady-state levels of capital accumulation and consumption under
the assumption that individuals have self-control preferences. By keeping the annual
discount factor at its CRRA level, we ￿rst ￿x ￿ at 2 and vary ￿ then we ￿x ￿ at
0:00009 and vary ￿. Tables 3 and 4 display our results for both cases. The results
are the same as those in Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008). Table 3 demonstrates that an
increase in the intensity of temptation distorts capital accumulation severely and causes a
reduction in steady-state consumption. Similarly, Table 4 shows the e⁄ects of an increase
in an individual￿ s willingness to substitute current temptation consumption with future
temptation consumption. Higher values of ￿ mean that individuals prefer more current
temptation consumption. Not surprisingly, higher values of ￿ result in a reduction in the
steady-state level of capital, which in turn causes a reduction in the steady-state level of
consumption.
Table 3: (￿ = 0:978;￿ = 2;￿ = 2)
￿ Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
￿ = 0:0004 1:120 2:386 0:939 2:132 0:103 0:984
￿ = 0:001 1:067 2:046 0:918 1:917 0:122 0:938
In this section we present our results for an economy in which agents have self-control
preferences and we compare the e⁄ects of the aforementioned three reform proposals on
15Please consult Fuster et al. (2005) for a detailed exposition of the reform proposals with regard to
the US social security system.
19Table 4: (￿ = 0:978;￿ = 0:00009)
￿ Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
￿ = 2 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:342 0:087 1:026
￿ = 3 1:075 2:091 0:922 1:946 0:119 0:944
both economic aggregates and social welfare. Our model provides the opportunity to
compare the e⁄ects of two opposite factors on savings (capital accumulation). While the
existence/availability of PSAs causes an increase in savings, individuals with self-control
preferences save less in order to escape from the huge self-control cost associated with
resisting to temptation once the accumulated assets become available. We present our
results in Table 5. The e⁄ects of the three reform proposals on economic aggregates and
social welfare are slightly di⁄erent from those we documented in Table 2 for an economy
populated by individuals featuring CRRA preferences. In particular, the highest levels
of capital stock and average expected utility are reached under the PSA+Annuity reform
scenario.
Table 5: Self-Control Preferences
￿s(%) ￿(%) K Y C K=Y EU
PAYG 3.6 0 100 100 100 2.350 100
PSA 0.9 2.7 116.167 104.781 102.015 2.620 103.212
PSA+Annuity 0.9 2.7 128.049 107.970 103.993 2.795 104.324
Elimination 0 0 111.501 103.434 101.443 2.517 101.512
For the sake of a more concise comparison, we created Table 6; this table presents
the levels of capital stock and average expected utility under the three alternative reform
proposals for both CRRA and self-control cases. Table 6 reveals that while the elimin-
ation reform scenario yields the highest welfare in the CRRA case, the PSA+Annuity
reform yields the highest welfare in the self-control case. The intuition is the following:
Individuals with self-control preferences are tempted to consume their entire wealth each
period. Payroll taxes help those individuals to reduce their cost of exerting self-control in
order to resist temptation. This additional bene￿t provided by a PAYG system creates
welfare improvement.
Still, this additional bene￿t of a PAYG system is not large enough to exceed the
bene￿ts associated with eliminating the entire social security system. The PSA reforms
provide the same additional bene￿t to working age individuals as the PAYG system.
20Although under CRRA preferences the elimination scenario results in the highest welfare
gain, the welfare bene￿ts of PSA+Annuity and PSA scenarios are higher under self-
control preferences. The reason why this obtains is simple: PSA reforms not only provide
the additional bene￿t of PAYG system but also come with higher retirement provisions.
Table 6: Comparison
CRRA Self-Control
K EU K EU
PAYG 100 100 100 100
PSA 113:631 103:280 116:167 103:212
PSA+Annuity 122:703 103:563 128:049 104:324
Elimination 114:331 104:108 111:501 101:512
Finally we check the case where individuals face an extremely severe self-control
problem. For this purpose we set the risk-aversion parameter of the momentary utility
function, ￿, equal to 2 and we set the temptation function parameters ￿ and ￿ equal to
2 and 0:00065 respectively. We choose ￿ = 1:0117 in order to converge to the long-term
capital-output ratio of the US economy when a PAYG system is in use. Table 7 below
presents the results.
Table 7: Severe Temptation
￿s(%) ￿(%) K Y C K=Y EU
PAYG 3.6 0 100 100 100 2.350 100
PSA 0.9 2.70 117.038 104.991 102.088 2.620 101.970
PSA+Annuity 0.9 2.70 128.584 108.101 103.970 2.795 103.958
Elimination 0 0 110.475 103.130 101.320 2.517 98.443
As it can be seen in Table 7, in contrast to our previous results, the current PAYG
system dominates the elimination reform by generating higher welfare. Since PSA and
PSA+Annuity reforms provide the same additional bene￿t as PAYG, it comes as no
surprise that in the case of severe temptation they end-up performing better than the
elimination scenario.
Because of higher retirement bene￿ts, in this environment both PSA and PSA+Annuity
reforms outperform the PAYG scenario with regards to welfare. A higher value of the
time preference parameter, ￿, might contribute in delivering the above results. Nev-
ertheless, these results are important in that they blatantly manifest how sensitive are
21the welfare consequences of various reform proposals to little deviations from the CRRA
case.
In summary, we show that if an economy is populated by individuals with self-control
problems, the gain from the two reform proposals is larger than what we observed in the
CRRA case. More interestingly the elimination reform proposal even decreases welfare
in comparison to the PAYG system when individuals have severe temptation problem.
5 Conclusions
Population aging due to low birth and morbidity rates and the resulting expansion of
social security bene￿ts have prompted lively debates around the long-term viability of
unfunded social security.16 Several reform proposals are being discussed for the US
Economy and other industrialized countries, all of which converge to a common resultant:
social security must be reformed in the direction of a funded rather than an unfunded
system.
In this paper we examine departures from a Pay-As-You-Go social security system
towards a system consisting of two parts: A "de￿ned bene￿ts" component and a "de￿ned
contributions" one. This is implemented by means of annexing a(n) (individually man-
aged) Personal Security Account to a universal (PAYG-based) pension system.
We quantitatively assess the attractiveness (i.e., the welfare enhancing potential) of
such a funded scheme in an economy populated by agents that face self control issues.
To this purpose, we use two di⁄erent benchmarks: a economy featuring PAYG social
security populated by self control agents (Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)) and an eco-
nomy featuring funded (as in this paper) social security but populated by CRRA agents.
Furthermore, we re￿ne our analysis by investigating the relative appeal of two distinct
scenarios: PSAs without annuitization and PSAs with mandatory annuitization.
Our analysis suggests that the availability of PSAs increases savings. This is princip-
ally true for CRRA agents. However, it is very ambiguous whether self-control agents
will be better o⁄with a genuine PAYG system, or with a funded system of the analyzed
hybrid structure that prescribes mandatory annuitization, as it eventually depends on
the intensity of the self-control problem.
Our results in this paper highlight the important role that self control preferences
play, especially with regards to the kind of reform that could generate the highest welfare.
While when the analysis is restricted to CRRA preferences our ￿ndings initially con￿rm
those in other studies (e.g.,Fuster et al. (2005)), i.e., we also ￿nd that the complete
elimination of any social security is the policy that maximizes welfare, when self-control
16See US Social Security Administration (2008)
22preferences are introduced instead, we come across a drastic alteration of our results: the
elimination of social security becomes the least desirable policy reform from a welfare
maximization standpoint, i.e., PSA and PSA+Annuity reforms give rise to larger welfare
improvements under self-control preferences.
In conclusion, our research indicates that the incontestable advantage of the elim-
ination scenario under CRRA preferences rapidly vanishes as self control is introduced
and becomes progressively more severe. Our additional example con￿rms this ￿nding:
in the case of severe temptation the CRRA pecking order is completely reversed, and
the elimination of social security becomes the least desirable policy.
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